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The Modern University, Ltd.* 
 
Today, the university in the United Kingdom (UK) appears to be being led far from its 
educational, egalitarian roots. It appears to be a corporate beast, increasingly marketised, 
commodified and commercialised. In recent years, many words have been written on this 
matter.1 In this article, I wish to consider how these perceived changes could affect a 
cherished notion for academics – academic freedom. I connect the marketisation of UK 
higher education to the (comparatively) recent economic changes in the structure of 
capitalism, and the rise of neoliberal economic theory.  
 This article contends that the modern shift to commercialisation and bureaucratisation 
in the university is not a new trend. Going back several hundred years’ state and market 
control in rationalising learning has been constant. The university should be seen as the 
precursor to the modern corporation, rather than its antithesis, with the historically marketised 
elements of the university simply being accentuated. Changes in the nature of capitalism have 
led to a change in the structure of corporations, which now operate in a system of competition 
rather than exchange. The effects of this change have made their mark in higher education. In 
this system, the work of the academic, and the widely touted idea of ‘academic freedom’, 
serves the ends of the university as a corporation.  
 Academic freedom is a term with a very nebulous and catholic meaning. It has often 
been synonymous with an idea of a university as a space for learning, inquiry and critical 
discussion. However, I do not take this view. Much of our discourse surrounding the 
university centres on an idealised view of academic freedom. Countering discourse which 
reads academic freedom as an expansive, empowering notion, I follow Stanley Fish in taking 
a deflationary reading of the term. Fish reads academic freedom as nothing more than the 
freedom to do one’s job.  
 I advance several arguments in support of this position. I first introduce the idea of 
academic freedom, and its legal position in relation to the UK academy. I then introduce 
Fish’s definition of academic freedom as freedom to academicise, contending that this view is 
one which would have great import in UK higher education. Next, I turn to the recent funding 
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reforms to UK universities, including the introduction of £9,000 fees, and place them in their 
historical context in relation to state involvement in higher education over the past century. I 
place them within a broader history of governmental intervention in universities. I contend 
that the resistance to perceived marketisation and administrative meddling in academic 
matters is misplaced. The institution’s history illustrates that the university is the model for 
corporations, not vice versa.  
 In support of this view, I draw upon the writing of Maurizio Lazzarato, and his idea of 
‘immaterial labour’. Engaging with Lazzarato’s thought, I argue that today, within a 
neoliberal economic system, Fish’s deflationary account of academic freedom is one which is 
both realistic, and will enable scholars within the university to better challenge the 
commercialisation they oppose. Academic freedom must be understood as nothing more than 
the freedom to do one’s job as a good corporate worker. In such a view, it offers an 
alternative to immaterial labour, which can end up as an exploitative  
, and a paradigmatic form of immaterial labour.  
 What this indicates is that far from being the hotbed of revolt and revolution, the 
university is an embodiment of what many academics in their politics aim to overthrow. I 
conclude that it is only by understanding the intrinsically corporate nature of the university 
that bettering the university can be achieved. 
 
I. Academic Freedom 
 
In 1988, tenure was removed from academics at UK universities, through the Education 
Reform Act.2 The 1988 Act introduced a vast new machinery designed to make universities 
more accountable for the public money which they received.3 It created the role of University 
Commissioners, who were given the power to remove academic staff from their positions. 
Tenure was understood as protection from dismissal in the absence of good cause. Unlike 
tenure in the United States of America (USA), it could not be usurped by universities closing 
down whole departments to effect dismissals.4 Despite this limitation, section 202 (2) (a) 
makes it clear that Commissioners should:  
[E]nsure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received 
wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without 
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placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their 
institutions.5 
 
This section, introduced as an amendment, built upon the provisions of the Education (No. 2) 
Act 1986 which placed a duty on higher education establishments to secure freedom of 
speech “within the law” for their members.6 These statutes reflect the general position within 
the UK, which is that academic freedom is not an absolute value, but rather something that 
has to be taken into account by a variety of decision-makers.7 This important place for 
academic freedom is also reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, which declares that academic freedom is to be “respected”,8 but the Charter does not 
go further and define the term. Despite the protections in EU law, the protection of academic 
freedom in UK law is feeble.9 Stanley Fish is doubtless correct in claiming that academic 
freedom is “rhetorically strong but legally weak”.10  
 In the USA courts, including the Supreme Court, have been more forward in dealing 
with issues, and the definitions, of academic freedom and the boundaries and limits of the 
term. Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v New Hampshire saw that there were four essential 
freedoms in the university: the freedoms to determine who may teach, what may be taught, 
how it shall be taught, and who shall be taught.11 More recently, potentially limiting the term, 
in Garcetti v Ceballos the Supreme Court ruled by a 5-4 majority that the First Amendment 
did not apply to statements made as part of an employee’s job duties.12 The ambiguity 
surrounding how this case applies to universities and academic freedom has led to lower 
courts using Garcetti to uphold the dismissals of faculty who claimed that they were 
exercising protected speech.13 
 Despite these judicial interventions and attempts at placing limits on this nebulous 
‘freedom’, what Michel Foucault declared about sex in the modern world is equally true of 
academic freedom. This is namely that we have not consigned academic freedom to a shadow 
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existence, but we have spoken of it ad infinitum¸ whilst exploiting it as the secret.14 In so 
doing, we fail to reveal its core with precision. It is for this reason that a plethora of views of 
what academic freedom is, and what it allows, has proliferated. These views range from 
viewing academic freedom as a claim to a universal ideal,15 to decrying the lack of collegial 
public defence of this universal ideal,16 to a view that it is no more than freedom for 
professionals to do their jobs and just their jobs.17 These divergent views have led to a muddy 
and inchoate view of what academic freedom means.18  
 In particular, attention can be drawn to the nature of the term, academic freedom. But 
freedom to do what? And whose freedom?19 Why should academics enjoy exemptions and 
privileges not enjoyed by other citizens?20 To be sure, academic freedom comes from a 
medieval tradition which pre-dates current meanings of the word ‘freedom’.21 The 
Universities can ultimately (albeit in a fractured manner) trace their existence back to 
ecclesiastical origins, and have been rooted in an intellectual tradition created to defend the 
autonomy of the Church.22 The privileges of academics, which now pass under the name of 
academic freedom, were originally ecclesiastical and guaranteed by the Pope.23 
 Separate from this tradition, what Williams has called an ‘idea discourse’ has grown 
up around the university and academic freedom.24 The history of the idea of the university is 
different from the history of the actual institution. It is wrong to think that the university ever 
had a discrete idea grounding it. The university has never existed in a pure state from which it 
veered off course. Idea discourse treats the history of the university as a history of ideas (or 
Ideas) rather than a history of institutions.25 It takes the perspective and represents the 
interests of those who issue it, defining the university through their eyes.26 
                                               
14 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, volume 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p.35.  
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19 Anthony Arblaster, Academic Freedom (Harmondsworth: Penguin Education, 1974), p.10.  
20 Fish, Versions of Academic Freedoms, p.1; Frederick Schauer, “Is There a Right to Academic 
Freedom,” University of Colorado Law Review 77 (2006): pp.907-927, 913. 
21 Russell, Academic Freedom, p.1.  
22 Russell, Academic Freedom, p.1. 
23 Russell, Academic Freedom, p.2. 
24 Jeffrey J Williams, “History as a Challenge to the Idea of the University,” JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, 
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 This can be seen in a wide variety of thinkers who have written on the university. 
Jacques Derrida’s ‘idea of the university’ conceives of the university as something that 
should be without condition, and have the humanities at its heart.27 Cardinal Newman wrote 
of the idea of the university in the nineteenth century, referring to a community of thinkers, 
engaged in a free sphere of thinking, not for any specific end, but rather, as an end in itself.28 
Thomas Jefferson wrote that the purpose of a university was a civic one, and the students at 
such a school of learning would form the statesmen, legislators and judges of the future.29 
Writing in 1970, E P Thompson placed emphasis upon subversion in order to resurrect a 
better idea of a university, arguing that it should be transformed “into a centre of free 
discussion and action, tolerating and even encouraging “subversive” thought and activity, for 
a dynamic renewal of the whole society”.30 
 All of these individuals have different and varied ‘expectations’ of what the university 
should be.31 How we view the university as an institution directly impacts upon the freedoms 
which are exercised by its members. Stanley Fish, in engaging with the question of what 
academics should do as part of their profession, draws versions of academic freedom into five 
separate schools, each of which has a differing perspective on the university and the role of 
academic freedom within it. Fish contends that this taxonomy broadly represents the 
spectrum of views and interpretations on the subject, from the most deflationary to the most 
radical.32 The examples Fish cite have been criticised as containing a lack of specificity, a 
concern for the academic freedom of staff and not students and a defensive proclamation of 
the rights of academics.33 However, whilst there are disadvantages in any taxonomical 
approach, Fish’s study allows an insight into the spectrum of views which exist surrounding 
exactly what academics are allowed to do. In particular, his own approach to the field has the 
potential to be very valuable in the face of current marketisation in UK higher education.  
 The two most extreme schools in Fish’s taxonomy he reads as not being in line with 
the university’s aims to disseminate knowledge through teaching and research, nicely 
                                               
27 Jacques Derrida, “The future of the profession or the university without condition (thanks to the 
“Humanities”, what could take place tomorrow),” in: Tom Cohen (ed.), Jacques Derrida and the 
Humanities: A Critical Reader (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.24-57. 
28 John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, Frank M Turner (ed.) (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996).  
29 Thomas Jefferson, “Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia, 1818,” in: Thomas 
Jefferson, Writings (New York: Library of America, 1984), pp.457-476, 459-460. 
30 E P Thompson, Warwick University Ltd: Industry, Management and the Universities (Nottingham: 
Spokesman Books, 2013), p.166.  
31 Williams, “History as a Challenge,” p.58. 
32 Fish, Versions of Academic Freedoms, p.1. 
33 Ronald Barnett, The idea of higher education (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p.134.  
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illustrating how our expectations of the university’s role impacts upon what freedoms its 
members can exercise.34 The most extreme Fish terms the ‘academic freedom as revolution’ 
school. This school sees education demanding positive political action (rather than pedagogic 
action) on the part of those who practice it. When the university’s obligations clash with 
social justice, social justice always triumphs. The University therefore becomes a vehicle for 
social change, with academic freedom the driving force. The impacts both the research 
undertaken by the academic, and the teaching they carry out. In Henry Giroux’s words, 
teaching comes with responsibilities including fighting for:  
An inclusive and radical democracy by recognising that education [is] … about 
providing the conditions for assuming the responsibilities we have as citizens to expose 
human misery and to eliminate the conditions that produce it.35 
 
The ‘academic freedom as critique’ school sees critique of the dominant ideology and power 
structures as the academic’s vocation. Characterised by scholars such as Judith Butler, this 
school sees dissent not as confirming to accepted professional norms, but as taking aim at 
those norms that are already accepted.36 In this way, academic freedom becomes another 
engine (albeit more indirect) of social progress. For Derrida, this university claims an 
unconditional freedom to question and to assert, and the right to say publicly all that is 
required by research, knowledge and thought concerning the truth.37 It is the university, for 
Derrida, which professes the truth. He thinks a university that is self-determining and self-
thinking, with the humanities at its centre. Without being granted the freedom to critique the 
dominant forms of power operating in society, academia will only serve those interests, rather 
than challenge them.  
 The third school Fish denotes as ‘academic exceptionalism or uncommon beings’. 
This school sees academics as intellectually and morally uncommon, over and above the 
population at large. As such, they require and deserve special privileges which the general 
public would not receive, namely academic freedom. This is reflected in the thought of Roger 
Brown, who has argued that academics have an ‘intellectual curiosity’ which needs to be 
                                               
34 Fish, Versions of Academic Freedoms, p.13. 
35 Henry A Giroux, Against the Terror of Neoliberalism: Politics Beyond the Age of Greed (Boulder, 
CO: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), p.128. 
36 Judith Butler, “Israel/Palestine and the Paradoxes of Academic Freedom,” Radical Philosophy 135 
(2006): pp.8-17; Judith Butler, “Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity,” Critical Inquiry 35 (2009): pp.773-795.  
37 Derrida, “The future of the profession or the university without condition,” p.24. 
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protected from unnecessary interference and control.38 It is clear that Fish does not think that 
academics have such a role. Bill Readings saw this pragmatism as glorying in the university’s 
lack of external reference.39 In contrast, Readings saw education as a radical form of 
dialogue,40 with academics holding a special role in teaching, which belongs to “justice rather 
than truth”.41 
 The fourth school Fish terms ‘for the common good’. This school sees the academic 
task as distinctive. The task of advancing knowledge involves following the evidence 
wherever it leads, and as such the academic requires complete and unlimited freedom to 
pursue inquiry and publish its results. This school connects academic freedom to democracy, 
and the democratic values of free and open inquiry.42 This can be seen in Arthur Lovejoy’s 
1937 definition of academic freedom as:  
[T]he freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of learning to 
investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions … 
without interference … unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his own 
profession  to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics.43  
 
This common good school is also reflected in what can be read as a foundational document 
for academic freedom in the USA, the American Association of University Professors’ 
(AAUP) 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.44 The 
Declaration makes clear that the academic’s responsibility is to the wider public to whom the 
institution itself is morally amenable. Nevertheless, this right to academic freedom comes 
with a correlative duty – it can be asserted only by those who carry out their work “in the 
temper of the scientific inquirer” and should not be used for uncritical partisanship.45 The 
common good school has famous adherents. Ronald Dworkin argued that academic freedom 
insulated scholars from the university administrators, and prevented them being dictated to 
                                               
38 Roger Brown, “The governance of the new universities: Do we need to think again?” Perspectives 5 
(2001): pp.42-47. 
39 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p.107. 
40 Readings, The University in Ruins, p.154. 
41 Readings, The University in Ruins, p.161; Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community, Pierre 
Joris (tr.) (Barrytown, NY: Station Hill Press, 1988). 
42 Fish, Versions of Academic Freedoms, p.11. 
43 Arthur O Lovejoy, “Academic Freedom”, in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (London: 
Macmillan Publishers, 1930), p.384. 
44 “1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure” In: American 
Association of University Professors, Policy Documents & Reports (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008), p.298; Fish, Versions of Academic Freedoms, p.11. 
45 “1915 Declaration,” p.298. 
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about what will be taught.46 Such a view has crossed the Atlantic. Anthony Arblaster argued 
that academic freedom must involve openness in education, engaging with a diversity of 
views, encouraging flexibility and experimentation, with students having a major share in the 
process.47 
 The final school represents Fish’s own deflationary view of higher education. 
Academic freedom becomes equivalent simply with the university’s mission to impart 
knowledge.48 Fish argues that the university’s mission is to produce and disseminate 
academic knowledge and to train those who take up this task in the future.49 This knowledge 
is produced through disinterested academic inquiry. Academic morality for Fish does not rest 
upon a normative basis, or an ideal, but is merely being conscientious in the pursuit of truth.50 
Fish’s conception of academic freedom can be summarised as a direction for academics to 
“just do your job”.51 Academic freedom is freedom to academicise, a necessary condition for 
academics to carry out the university’s mission of producing and disseminating knowledge.52 
Academicising involves introducing students to bodies of knowledge and the tradition of 
inquiry, and equipping students with analytical skills, enabling them to engage with those 
traditions in their thinking.53 
 In this reading, academic freedom has corresponding duties,54 and Fish is sharply 
critical of academics that see academic freedom as freedom from the “everyday obligations 
of the workplace”.55 There is no room in this vision for politicising actions in academia, and 
no room to include wider societal values within teaching, except in introducing them in ways 
that are appropriate to the academic enterprise. Politics must be treated as a topic of 
interrogation, not proselytising, in teaching;56 proper academic debate involves discussions 
surrounding curriculum development, research direction and teaching materials.57  
 This is a minimalist view to the freedom within the academy, to be sure. To treat 
academic practice as just being a job abandons lofty pretences of acting for the common good 
                                               
46 Ronald Dworkin, “We need a new interpretation of academic freedom,” In: Louis Menand (ed.), The 
future of academic freedom (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp.181-198, 183.  
47 Arblaster, Academic Freedom, pp.13-14. 
48 Fish, Versions of Academic Freedoms, p.9.  
49 Stanley Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 
p.99. 
50 Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, p.102. 
51 Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, pp. 16, 153, 178. 
52 Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, p.82. 
53 Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, pp.12-13. 
54 Russell, Academic Freedom, p.41. 
55 Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, p.113. 
56 Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, p.30; Fish, Versions of Academic Freedom, pp.34-35. 
57 Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, p.20. 
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or seeking wider political change in society. Fish is quite clear that universities should 
therefore not strive to reach beyond the students they are seeking to teach into the wider 
community as civic institutions. These are political goals, and in following them universities 
“are guilty both of practicing without a license and of defaulting on our professional 
responsibilities”.58 Yet these political goals which Fish sees as inappropriate for the academic 
mission also include research having to show social or economic benefits and impacts, which 
ends up instrumentalising the academic process. Instead, Fish indicates that academics are 
part of a profession, like doctors and lawyers, which has its own internal practices. This 
justification for academic practice is entirely internal to the academy, which can only do this 
if it is left to regulate itself, within the limits of that profession. This does not mean that the 
academic process is impartial and completely neutral. Rather, the profession would regulate 
itself, having in mind the goals and limits of the university’s mission.  
 Unlike doctors and lawyers however, academics do not have the same types of 
professional bodies regulating their practice, representing their views and lobbying for 
change.59 As Lee and Davies argue, a view which I am inclined to agree with, it may be time 
for academics to take the step in the twenty-first century that doctors and lawyers took in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and institute a professional body and code of practice to 
regulate ethics and standards.60 Such a move will help ensure that academics can still 
‘academicise’ in the future. This deflationary account of academic freedom, properly 
defended, would have great import in UK higher education. This is not least because the 
changes in the twenty-first and the twentieth century to higher education, and the longer 
history of the university, illustrate that academic freedom, and the university, has never been 
a revolutionary force in this country.  
 
II. Higher Education in the UK after the Browne Report 
 
The higher education landscape in the UK has been marked in recent years by a debate over 
how universities are to be funded, and how they are to best contribute to the country’s 
economy.61 However, whilst such debates may appear novel and not in step with the history 
of the university, the opposite is the case. There has, since the end of the Second World War, 
                                               
58 Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, p.67. 
59 Lee and Davies, “No More “Business as Usual”,” pp.540-542. 
60 Lee and Davies, “No More “Business as Usual”,” p.542. 
61 See, for example, Stefan Collini, What are Universities For? (London: Penguin Books, 2012). 
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been an almost constant discussion (albeit at varying levels of volume) about how 
universities can contribute to the national good, understood in economic terms.  
 The background to the recent discussions has been a rapid expansion in the higher 
education sector. In the mid 1980’s there were fewer than 60 universities, and participation 
rates were around six per cent. Fast forward twenty years and 140 universities and university 
colleges provide undergraduate degree programmes, and 42 per cent of all 18 year-olds enter 
higher education.62 This does not take into account the fact that the higher education system 
quadrupled in size between 1946 and 1980.63 This expansion of the universities can be read 
as the natural culmination of the educational revolution which led to free public elementary 
schools in the 1870’s and free public secondary schools in 1944.64 The progress of this 
educational revolution was allied with the development of a liberal democratic society. 
Universities became a key element of the economic profile of the UK throughout the 
twentieth century. Illustrative of this, Winston Churchill saw egalitarianism in education as 
necessary to establish: 
[A] state of society where the advantages and privileges which hitherto have been 
enjoyed only by the few, shall be far more widely shared by the men and youth of the 
nation as a whole.65 
 
British universities were of diverse origins and types, formed in different ways, but 
converged over time towards a single model.66 The modern university system was shaped in 
the nineteenth century, with the establishment of the “redbrick” institutions, serving local 
communities, and the removal of religious tests for entrance.67 The civic universities 
established from 1825 were built on commercial and industrial wealth and the demands of a 
rapidly growing economy and the commitment to culture, science, the arts and philanthropy 
of the elite communities in those cities. These universities were established by government 
who recognised the economic and social importance of those institutions, and underwritten 
by endowment and privilege.68 From 1889, universities in England and Wales were given 
                                               
62 Nick Foskett, “Markets, government, funding and the marketization of UK higher education,” In: The 
Marketisation of Higher Education, pp.25-38, 25.  
63 Peter Scott, The Crisis of the University (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), p.57. 
64 Scott, The Crisis of the University, p.124. 
65 The Taylor Report, A New Partnership for Our Schools: Report of the Committee of Enquiry 
appointed jointly by the Secretary of State for Education and Science and the Secretary of State for 
Wales under the chairmanship of Mr Tom Taylor CBE, (London: HMSO, 1977), p.158.  
66 Robert Anderson, British Universities Past and Present (London, Continuum, 2006).  
67 Universities Tests Act 1871 c 26 (34 & 35 Vict). 
68 Foskett, “Markets, government, funding and the marketization of UK higher education,” p.27. 
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annual grants from the state. In order to qualify for these, and for the royal charters which 
gave rights to confer degrees, common standards had to be observed.69 By the start of World 
War One, all universities except for Oxford and Cambridge relied on the state for up to one 
third of their funding, in a domesticated market environment.70  
 In 1919, the University Grants Committee (UGC) was created to distribute state 
grants whilst respecting the autonomy of universities, and promoting the importance of 
teaching and research in a university.71 We can see at an early stage the importance of 
‘autonomy’, or academic freedom, for the university’s mission of educating the future wealth 
creators of the society. The UGC was underwritten by government, allowing for a growth in 
the number of universities through the creation of new institutions.  
 However, this was very much an elite business. In 1950 only 3.4% of the population 
entered higher education.72 In a post-war expansion, university education was made a pillar 
of the welfare state, and demand for universities outstripped supply. Following the Robbins 
Report of 1963, new campus-based universities were founded,73 and maintenance grants were 
introduced for students in 1962.74 The Robbins expansion was driven by a belief that all 
young persons qualified by ability should have the opportunity to enter higher education.75 
This led to an effective nationalisation and central control of universities, enabling students to 
attend universities well away from where they grew up.76 University education was seen as a 
public good accessible to all citizens on equal terms.77  
 By the 1970’s, and the start of the collapse of the post-war political settlement, 
successive UK governments needed to grow higher education to produce larger numbers of 
better educated graduates to ensure that the UK economy would be competitive in global 
markets.78 This was bolstered by creating universities from former polytechnics, which 
                                               
69 Robert Anderson, “British universities past, present and future: convergence and divergence,” in 
Louis Coiffait (ed.), Blue skies: new thinking about the future of higher education (London, Pearson, 
2011), pp.57-60, 57.  
70 Anderson, “British universities past, present and future,” p.57. 
71 Michael Shattock and Robert Berdahl, “The British University Grants Committee 1919-83: Changing 
Relationships with Government and the Universities,” Higher Education 13 (1984): pp.471-499. 
72 National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, Report 6: Widening participation in higher 
education for students from lower socio-economic groups and students with disabilities (1997), 
available at https://bei.leeds.ac.uk/Partners/NCIHE/. 
73 Committee on Higher Education, Higher Education, Cmnd 2154, 1962-63. 
74 Anderson Report on Grants to Students, Cmnd 1051, 1959/60; Education Act 1962 c 12 (10 & 11 
Eliz 2). 
75 Committee on Higher Education, Higher Education, p.49. 
76 House of Commons Library, Student grants, loans and tuition fees, Research Paper No 97/119 (13 
November 1997). 
77 Anderson, “British universities past, present and future,” p.58. 
78 Foskett, “Markets, government, funding and the marketization of UK higher education,” p.29. 
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transferred them from local authority control to independent corporations.79 The concept of 
the ‘market’ thus began to seriously enter the lexicon as an effective mechanism to manage 
the education sector. Crucial here is the idea that markets are driven by consumer choice, and 
choice means competition between providers. Market mechanisms would enhance choice, 
and competition would drive down unit costs, enabling the education sector as a whole to 
grow without a proportional increase in public expenditure.80 This is the ideology 
underpinning reforms over the past thirty years.  
 The current university funding regime is governed by the implications of the 
Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance, the ‘Browne 
Report’, published in 2010.81 The current model is a ‘quasi-market’, which directly involves 
the government in many areas, as the judgment was made that a completely free open market 
in higher education was too great a risk.82 The Browne Report concluded that everyone who 
had the potential should have the opportunity to benefit from higher education, which would 
have the indirect impact of benefitting the British economy.83 However, in balancing this 
noble aim, and invoking the language of sustainability, the Report recommended raising 
tuition fees, with students receiving a loan from the Government to cover fees, and an 
additional loan to cover cost of living, which would be repaid when the student was earning a 
sufficient amount after graduating.84 As a result, the cap on tuition fees was raised to £9,000 
in 2010.85  
 Coupled with the rise in fees, universities were not exempted from the cuts in public 
expenditure carried out by the UK Government (in line with similar moves worldwide in the 
face of the 2008 financial crisis). The central funds available for higher education have been 
markedly cut by over 50%, which amounts to over £4bn.86 The reduction in public money is 
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made up for through a government loan which is paid to universities via its students. The 
student, rather than the State, is therefore responsible for the cost of their education. When 
the higher fees regime was challenged in court, it was made clear that setting up a system 
where individuals would have to take on a debt in order to pursue the study of a degree 
neither restricts nor restricts the right of education, guaranteed under European human rights 
laws.87 The High Court could not have been clearer: the fact that some persons would be 
“temperamentally or psychologically disinclined” to attend university due to the fees charged 
is ultimately irrelevant.88 
 What this means for universities is that more students equates to more money. For 
many years, successive governments capped the number of students universities could accept 
every year. From the 2015-16 academic year, this cap will be removed.89 This means that 
universities can recruit as many students as they wish to their courses. This may see more and 
more students being recruited from outside of the UK. Universities, pushed into the market 
and impacted by globalisation, have taken a global view of higher education. In the 2012-13 
academic year, student numbers fell by over 4,000, the first decline in thirty years. In the past 
thirty years, international and EU student recruitment at UK universities has increased from 
50,000 to over 300,000.90 The Coalition Government introduced stricter visa regulations for 
students in April 2012. In part driven by this, many UK universities have opened up 
campuses overseas, bringing a UK university experience to the student.91 
 This is what Nick Foskett has called a ‘wild environment’. This is one where groups 
of similar institutions, with different missions and strategies, differentiated on quality through 
entry grades and research reputation, serve different sorts of markets.92 Here, each university 
designs and implements its own strategy and competes with other institutions, and their 
survival depends upon market accountability.93 What has been created is a legally endorsed, 
human rights compliant, highly regulated market. The 2011 reforms view higher education as 
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a service industry and students are viewed as consumers of a product.94 Education is no 
longer seen as identical with the goal of man.95  
 Universities will compete for students, and efficiencies will be encouraged. As part of 
this marketization, private universities have been established, designed to increase 
competition and diversity in the higher education sector.96 Despite this, the upfront public 
cost of universities remains high. Government is underwriting a significant outlay upon 
students, who will pay back their loans in later life. Such a move is not without risk. More 
than £10bn is loaned to students each year. The amount loaned to students will top £100bn in 
2018, and will reach £330bn in current prices by the middle of the century.97  
 This picture is complicated further by the repayment structure. Graduates would not 
repay their loans until they started earning more than £21,000 per year, and the loan will be 
repaid at a rate of 9% of income above this threshold. Until an individual is in repayment, 
they will be charged an interest rate of 3% plus inflation on their loan. A tapered interest rate 
will be charged when income is above the earnings threshold, rising to 3% above inflation 
when an individual is earning £41,000 per year. The loan’s term is thirty years. After this 
point, any outstanding loan amount will be written off. Despite the rise in fees, there is an 
inherent risk for successive governments – if enough individuals fail to repay enough money, 
the student loan industry will become a huge liability. At the end of 2013/14, 58% of all 
student loans to date were eligible for repayment. 9% had been repaid in full, and thirty-six 
percent were not liable for repayment.98 In March 2014, the UK Government estimated that 
45% of university graduates would not earn enough to repay their student loans in full, after 
being criticised that they had been underestimating this number.99 This is close to the 48.6% 
figure which has been calculated as being the ‘cut-off’ point for savings under the new 
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regime. If more than this figure of students fails to repay their loans in full, then the new fees 
system will cost the Government more than the previous regime.100  
 In response to the Browne Report, a huge literature has grown up surrounding the 
‘marketization’, ‘corporatisation’ and privatisation of the university sector.101 Typical of this 
response is Terry Eagleton, who saw the humanities as about to disappear from universities, 
as they did not fit into the government’s plans to produce economically active graduates.102 
Yet, as Andrew Wernick has argued, the university as an institution for advancing knowledge 
and for training the high professions has always been enmeshed in material interests and 
ideology.103 The university in the UK has always been part of the State’s interests. The 
university’s scholars, and the freedom they exercise in this role, should not be conceived as 
resistant to these processes. Our present difficulties with the university have been built into 
the system right from the beginning.104 
 
III. The University as a Corporation  
 
The predominant target of recent criticism has been the corporate university.105 Academic 
freedom may seem anathema to this corporate world, but it was actually a constituent element 
of the development of the modern research university. Bureaucracy and markets have 
controlled and moulded academic freedom, and rationalised academic life.106 However, the 
university is the legal and historical model for corporations, and academic freedom is a 
crucial part of the development of the university as corporation.  
 The legal standing of corporations is inseparable from the history of the American 
university. In an early case, the Supreme Court defined corporations as having the legal 
standing of an individual. The corporation claiming those rights in this case was Dartmouth 
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College, established in 1767 as a public corporation.107 Chief Justice Marshall noted the 
characteristics of a corporation, it being an artificial being, intangible and being a creature of 
law. Most important of all, the corporation is immortal and individual, it comprising of a 
perpetual succession of many persons. Just as a church might continue over time as ‘one 
body’ without state interference, so too could Dartmouth, and so too could a corporate 
business.  
 The university-as-corporation was not an American invention. The university as a 
self-governing academic institutions appeared in the Middle Ages as a corporation. The 
medieval university was an ecclesiastical corporation – the earliest universities were part of 
the Church. This is why a medieval lecturer sat in a cathedra, a chair. The notion of a 
professorial chair stems from this.108 The cathedra had been, at first, where a bishop sat to 
teach. The church where his chair resided became by synecdoche a ‘cathedral’. From these 
high officials the chairs passed to professors – the funding of professorships originated in 
medieval canonries.109 The conception of the imaginative personality of a corporation 
appeared for the first time in the ecclesiastical writings of Pope Innocent IV.110 Innocent 
announced that when an ecclesiastical corporation of the type called a collegium was 
supposed to deliver an oath, they could have the oath sworn by a single person representing 
the college, rather than having oaths sworn by each of the members individually, as the 
collegium is in corporate matters figured as a person.111  
 The independence which the university established from the State and the Church in 
the Middle Ages can be connected to their incorporation. A university in the Middle Ages 
meant an institution of learning recognised by the Church or the State where the teachers or 
students were united in guilds enjoying a certain privilege or autonomy, where a ‘superior’ 
study such as Law, Medicine or Theology was taught in addition to the Seven Arts and 
Philosophy, and where definite curricula led to specific degrees.112 These degree giving 
schools were known as studium generale, denoting that they were open to all students of all 
Christian nations or all provinces of monastic orders.113  
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 The role academic freedom played in the university can be traced to this corporate 
structure in the High Middle Ages.114 In 1158, the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick 
Barbarossa issued the Authentica Habita edict protecting scholars.115 Academic freedom 
began as a feudal privilege of the professors to authoritatively teach and interpret the 
scholastic doctrines.116 Two prototypes of university autonomy emerged, in Paris and 
Bologna. It was the Parisian model that spread around Europe.117 In Paris autonomy was 
considered in terms of the freedom to teach, and applied to the professors, not the students. In 
Bologna, autonomy was vested in the student body, which hired the academics and reigned 
supreme in every area except for matters relating to the examination of candidates for 
degrees.118 Both institutions were subjected to external attempts at control, and academics 
responded by migrating to other towns. The Great Dispersion of 1229 is an example of this. 
This interference led to scholarly liberty being acknowledged as a university right, 
exemplified in Pope Gregory’s Papal Bull of 1231.119  
 Despite this French influence, academic freedom as it is commonly understood 
(especially by many of the views explored by Fish) is largely derived from the nineteenth 
century German research university. It was the German research university that transformed 
the functioning of learning and higher education in nineteenth-century Europe.120 The 
German model included the developments of graded written examination for undergraduates, 
seminar papers for graduate and postgraduate students, doctoral dissertations as the rite of 
passage into professional academic life, the notion of ‘publish or perish’ for a professorial 
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appointment and the constitution of the library catalogues recording and referencing such 
publications.121  
 The rationalisation of academia took place within a bureaucratised framework, 
typified by police science, Policy-Wissenschaft.122 Good policing aimed to see that useful 
arts, sciences, and crafts were learned, that resources were not wasted, and to make sure that 
productivity was maximised.123 Universities, just like in the UK during the last hundred 
years, were treated like any other form of economic production – students were to be made 
useful in the future for the State, and moulded into upright citizens.124 Within a structure 
policed by government ministers, and regulated by the burgeoning capitalist market, German 
universities developed an infrastructure of entrepreneurial activity.  
 Academic freedom was to be harnessed and developed by state supervision and the 
market to aid productivity.125 Academic fame would aid student recruitment, which in turn 
necessitated the production of further academic fame. Academia was thus inserted in the 
market in the Germanies; ministries recognised academic fame, which was left to the market 
in forms of expert and peer review.126 Academic freedom was shaped by the concepts of 
Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit, associated with the reforms of Wilhelm von Humboldt.127 In 
reality, Humboldt’s reforms were synthesised with Enlightenment traditions at the end of the 
nineteenth century, rather than being influential from their writing a hundred years 
previously.128 Once they were accepted, German universities embraced three interrelated 
principles: Lehrfreiheit, Lernfreiheit and Freiheit der Wissenschaft.129 Importantly, all these 
elements supported the university’s mission to help develop the State’s economy.  
 By Lehrfreiheit the German educator meant two things. Firstly, the university 
professor was free to examine bodies of evidence and had to report his findings in lectures or 
publications; he enjoyed freedom of teaching and inquiry as a member of the academic 
profession. Secondly, it denoted the paucity of administrative rules within the teaching 
system, to enable the academic to design their own syllabus, and not require prior 
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approval.130 Academic freedom was the atmosphere of consent that surrounded the whole 
process of research and the institution which it occurred within.131 This led to academics 
working together to improve their academic credit and reputation by mutually citing each 
other’s work.132 Techniques of academic self-registration and self-promotion flourished, and 
fame became important to attract students.133 This aspect had antecedents in the Parisian 
model of universities.134 
 Lernfreiheit, or ‘learning freedom’, represents a disclaimer of any university control 
over the students’ course save for that needed to prepare them for their examinations.135 This 
had antecedents in the Bolognese model of universities.136 The final aspect, Freiheit der 
Wissenschaft, reflected the right of academic self-governance and institutional autonomy of 
the university.137 The Humboldtian model was a unity of teaching and research, accepting the 
need for academic freedom to be enjoyed by academics and students, coupled with 
institutional autonomy from the state, exercising internal self-governance.138 We can 
therefore read academic freedom as part and parcel of the development of the university 
within modern capitalism. Academic freedom reinforced the aims and objectives of the 
university-as-corporation.  
 Today however, the nature of capitalism has shifted; neoliberalism is now the 
dominant economic ideology. In The Birth of Biopolitics Michel Foucault analysed the 
passage from the liberalism of the eighteenth century to the German ordoliberalism of the 
early twentieth century to American neoliberalism which developed in the late twentieth 
century.139 In so doing he revealed the mechanisms and principles that underlie contemporary 
capitalist society. These mechanisms, or apparatuses, have promoted insecurity, inequality 
and individualisation as part of ensuring the conditions of power to exercise a hold over 
conduct.140 Neoliberalism intervenes to promote multiplicity, differentiation and competition 
of enterprises and to incite and constrain each individual to become an entrepreneur of him or 
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herself and become ‘human capital’.141 The shift from liberalism to ordoliberalism was 
defined by the shift from exchange to competition; the logic of competition is generalised in 
neoliberalism to apply to the workings of all apparatuses of the state as well as subject 
considered as autonomous individuals. The market makes economic activity the general 
matrix of social and political relations, but it focuses not on exchange, but competition.142 
Whereas exchange related to equality, competition relates to inequality.  
 What this means is that corporations (including universities) no longer create products 
to sell to passive consumers, but they shape and create the social world in which they exist.143 
One must start from consumption rather than production; the capture of consumer markets 
(seen in the positioning of students as ‘consumers’ that need capturing through recruitment) 
is now the main business of corporations.144 This in turn has changed the nature and quality 
of work, forcing us to question the classic definition of work and workforce. The worker’s 
productivity and subjectivity have to be made susceptible to organisation and command.145 
Workers become ‘active subjects’ in the coordination of the functions of production. 146 This 
leads to the distinction between work and leisure time being blurred, with work-time 
expanding to fill “the entire time of life”.147 Living and producing therefore become 
indistinguishable.148 We are all empowered to take charge of our careers and become 
entrepreneurs within our delimited fields of production.  
 This new conception of work has been termed by Maurizio Lazzarato ‘immaterial 
labour’. Traditionally, labour tended to “produce the means of interaction, communication 
and cooperation for production directly”.149 Contrarily, immaterial labour creates immaterial 
products,150 and produces “the informational and cultural content of the commodity”.151 
Immaterial labour, as a result, involves a series of activities not normally recognised as 
‘work’. These activities involve defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, 
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tastes, consumer norms, and public opinion, and includes linguistic and intellectual 
activity.152 All these activities are, in Lazzarato’s terms, “mass intellectuality”.153 They have 
modified the role and function of intellectuals and their activities within society. Mass 
intellectuality has been created out of the demands of capitalist production and the forms of 
‘self-valorisation’ that the struggle against work has produced.154 
 Lazzarato’s analysis of capital and labour can be utilised here to illustrate the role of 
academic freedom today within this neoliberal arena. For Lazzarato, capitalism has no 
inherent logic. There is no independent and autonomous law driving capital forward. Its 
historical existence must be understood through the continual construction and rearticulation 
of its basic conditions of possibility through discursive and non-discursive apparatuses of 
power.155 Discursive apparatuses relate to control over statements, enunciations and what a 
subject may say. Contrarily, non-discursive apparatuses refer to the mechanisms that define, 
shape and intervene in what a subject may do.156 Lazzarato sees discursive apparatuses as 
defining what is important, striking or interesting, and determine and construct the problems 
of a society at a particular time. Lazzarato, who includes universities specifically as 
producers of discursive statements, argues that such apparatuses delimit what is possible.157 
 In this manner, I claim that what is claimed as academic freedom consists of 
discursive practices (mass intellectuality) that produce commodities that can be packaged and 
marketised, be they ideas (in the form of publications as academic currency), or courses 
(which are used to recruit students). Discursive views of what constitutes the rights of 
academics are co-opted and transformed into economically productive forms of behaviour 
and practice. The defence of academic freedom as necessary for the economic development 
of the State through higher education, made centuries ago by the cameralists, can be seen as 
being extended in modernity and neoliberal economics. Work produced by academics, no 
matter how ‘radical’ in the sense meant by Butler and Giroux, becomes part of capital’s mode 
of operation. Academics are part of a corporation which has production at its heart; academic 
freedom becomes part of the process of production at universities.  
 In this sense, Stanley Fish is correct to claim that academic freedom should be 
understood as nothing more than the freedom to do one’s job. We have, as members of staff 
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of a corporation, the power and freedom to fulfil our job description, which is today (and has 
been for centuries) designed to feed into the university’s corporate aims. Just because our 
corporation produced immaterial commodities, in the form of ideas, rather than cars, 
foodstuffs or computers, does not mean that the freedom for the worker is any different, or 
that academics should have special privileges over and above the population at large. This is 
in line with what Foucault himself wrote – that universities are a form of mass media which 
should not provide a reserve for scholars threatened by modern capital and information 
flows.158  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
Where then does this leave us today? My point in defending Fish’s deflationary account is 
not to dismiss all existing opposition to the university’s corporatisation. Nor is it to suggest 
that no resistance or opposition to managerial and corporate strategies is possible. My aim 
here is to refocus the debate surrounding academic freedom. Too much of the debate ignores, 
or effaces, the intrinsically corporate nature of the university. It is not possible to think of the 
university as a completely free place of enquiry because this has always been enmeshed in 
strategic interests.  
 What I suggest here is a modest proposal. By accepting the inherently corporate, 
politicised nature of the university, it will be possible to protect the academic’s freedom to 
academicise. Idealised notions of academic freedom, and of education, ignore not just the 
reality of the university today, but also the reality of the history of the university. They are 
based in a history and tradition which has never existed. As such, a dose of realism is needed. 
This realism is not pessimism. It is a pragmatic political reaction to the reality of today. A 
professional body for academics, with the possibility to regulate standards and ethics, has the 
potential to operate as a counter-weight to the pressures of marketization in higher education. 
The very existence of such a body accepts the various political and economic pressures that 
academia is subject to; it is not possible for academics to exist in an idealised, atomised world 
of teaching and research. Such a body also has the potential to provide its members a voice, 
which can be used as a political mechanism to oppose or moderate reforms of the university 
which members deem injurious to their interests.  
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 However, even more important than this is the question of what interests such a body 
would represent. Instituting such an organisation would necessitate academics to confront key 
questions: what do we understand academic freedom to be, what are the limits to our 
academic practices, and what exactly is the point and purpose of a university, given its 
corporate background and history. Such a debate is necessary, in order to stop us (in 
Foucault’s terms) from treating academic freedom as an imprecise, secretive notion, 
something we all rely upon instinctively but never define precisely. This debate is crucial, 
now more than ever. My contribution here, modest as it is, is to argue that how these 
questions have been considered to date has erred in their approach. The politics of unionism, 
organised labour, and of social movements, may be the best starting place in defending an 
idea of the university which rejects neoliberalism. The debate begins.  
